In its first ninety days, the second Trump Administration has been determined to pick fights, whether with its closest neighbors in this hemisphere in Latin America or the second-largest national economy on the far side of the globe, even if allegedly only to negotiate a good deal for the United States (“U.S.”).[1] Even before the trade war began, the administration, in its first days in office, quickly defunded and gutted the operations of the United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”), an agency whose global influence is long established and well recognized.[2] It earns praise for assisting many vulnerable, suffering people to better their lives.[3] It also earns criticism from leaders of target nations for its foreign meddling.[4]
USAID is not exclusively an altruistic extension of U.S. resources to smaller, less well-off people in other countries. USAID efforts have also been criticized as a political-diplomatic bludgeon in the international sphere to coerce economic or political cooperation out of other sovereign states.[5] However, in the interest of avoiding the complete demolition of a program that provides resources for so many marginalized and vulnerable groups, the U.S. should restructure USAID to maintain its (soft) power and protect its interests in resource-rich and politically volatile regions like Latin America.
China has exerted considerable influence with its Belt and Road Initiatives worldwide, particularly in Latin American countries.[6] Over the decades, USAID’s active presence and relief efforts have offered an alternative humanitarian influence to the infrastructure and industrial projects funded, supervised, and executed by the Chinese initiatives.[7] If the current U.S. administration is determined to minimize global Chinese influence through foreign aid, the U.S. should quickly restructure the USAID and restore the flow of foreign aid funding to preserve the U.S.’ global influence.[8]
On January 20, 2025, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 14169, “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid,” initiating a ninety-day suspension of all U.S. foreign development assistance programs to conduct a comprehensive review.[9] The order stated that the U.S. foreign aid system was “not aligned with American interests,” and, in some cases, opposed American values.[10] The order granted the Secretary of State authority to waive the suspension for specific programs.[11] President Trump announced he was significantly slashing funding for USAID, cutting eighty-three percent of the organization’s contracts related to foreign aid.[12] These funding cuts will have major global humanitarian, economic, and political reverberations. Latin American voices and experiences solidify the criticisms and pitfalls associated with USAID being wielded as a political bludgeon.[13]
A brief history of USAID is required to understand the current implications of the program’s demise. The USAID was established in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy through an executive order under the Foreign Assistance Act.[14] USAID consolidated various foreign aid programs into one agency and marked the beginning of modern U.S. foreign assistance.[15] This initiative, in part, was a measure to combat Soviet and communist influence during the Cold War by funding industrial, educational, and healthcare initiatives in developing countries to incentivize ties with the U.S. and disincentivize alignment with the Communist bloc.[16]
In modern contexts, USAID served a similar purpose. As tracked by the United Nations (“UN”), USAID contributed more than forty percent of global aid in 2024.[17] This was utilized as a measure to combat Chinese and Russian influence in countries that are rich in highly coveted natural resources. The program promoted global development through education, health, and social initiatives, which provided significant resources to marginalized populations and at-risk social and environmental initiatives in Latin America.[18] For example, the Central America Regional Security Initiative (“CARSI”) supports crime prevention, anti-corruption efforts, and justice system reforms in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, aiming to address the root causes of mass migration.[19] The Feed the Future Initiative improves agricultural productivity, food security, and nutrition in Guatemala, Honduras, and Haiti. Environmental efforts include the Amazon Regional Environment Program (“AREP”), which promotes sustainable land use, indigenous rights, and biodiversity conservation in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. In Colombia, USAID played a major role in post-conflict development, supporting ex-combatant reintegration and rural economic growth following the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla group.[20] The agency also provides humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans affected by financial collapse, supplying food aid, healthcare, and refugee support in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.[21] USAID, although fundamentally developed as a political tool to further U.S. interests, provided significant environmental benefits and humanitarian assistance that have positively impacted marginalized communities in developing nations.
Although USAID provided vital humanitarian aid to millions of people, several valid criticisms still exist surrounding the program. Critics contend that its primary function is to serve U.S. geopolitical interests, often using aid as a tool for political influence and regime change.[22] President Gustavo Petro of Columbia labeled U.S. aid as “poison,” and leaders in Venezuela and Nicaragua view USAID as an extension of Washington’s efforts to destabilize their governments.[23] Furthermore, President Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico articulated her disdain for the program’s lack of transparency about fund distribution: “this agency has funded everything from research projects to groups that oppose the government.”[24] Furthermore, critics claim that USAID’s humanitarian programs frequently benefit U.S. contractors more than local economies, fostering dependency rather than sustainable development.[25]
International Humanitarian Law holds several provisions prohibiting and condemning the infliction of unnecessary suffering on civilians or withholding vital resources during times of armed conflict.[26] However, no specific international provision addresses the withdrawal of critical aid.[27] Aid is typically a discretionary policy decision by donor countries rather than a legal obligation.[28] Although international law does not explicitly regulate the withdrawal of foreign aid, the U.S. should lift funding suspensions and begin reforms for USAID for political interests, if not for humanitarian interests. The U.S. should remember its soft power interest in Latin America, or in other words, keep its “carrot and stick” approach to strengthen diplomatic relationships and secure access to key natural resources.[29]
Certain international principles and agreements may influence or restrict the withdrawal of aid in specific contexts. For example, after the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was enacted in 1978, the U.S. signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001.[30] The Charter is a byproduct of the Organization of American States (“OAS”), established in 1948, which the U.S. saw as an opportunity to curb Communist influence in Latin America.[31] Article 2 of the Charter for the OAS states that the organization’s responsibilities include “to seek the solution of political, juridical and economic problems that may arise among them; to promote by cooperative action, their economic, social and cultural development…”[32] The Inter-American Democratic Charter further expands on these social and economic responsibilities by protecting democratic systems: “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to, and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections…”[33] These convictions echo USAID’s primary mission and goals: “promote democratic and resilient societies, support free and fair elections, bolster civil society, and protect human rights by helping countries develop good governance.”[34] If the language and principles of USAID directly reflect those in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, then the U.S. has a clear obligation to uphold them not only as a matter of policy consistency but also to honor its international commitments. By aligning its foreign aid practices with the values enshrined in such agreements, the U.S. credibility is weakened, leaving a soft power vacuum ready to be filled by other global powers like China.
Unfortunately, customary international law and its organizations may be ineffective in holding the U.S. accountable for its treaty obligations or the norms of customary international law.[35] These global systems have been used more as “a relationship of tutelage emerges in which big states are perceived as the enforcers and small states the targets,”[36] especially when considering the power dynamics between the U.S. and Latin America in the latter half of the 20th Century.[37] These agreements were made for the U.S. to increase its supervision of Latin America and regulate different countries’ democratic compliance unilaterally.[38] While USAID’s historical and contemporary impact in the region is complicated, its complete defunding threatens to leave a vacuum that other geopolitical actors may fill.[39] In particular, China has exerted considerable influence with its Belt and Road Initiative worldwide and especially in Latin American Countries.[40] Over the decades, USAID’s active presence and relief efforts offer an alternative humanitarian influence to the infrastructure and industrial projects funded, supervised, and executed by the Chinese initiatives.
The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) aims to enhance global trade and economic integration by investing in roads, railways, ports, energy projects, and digital infrastructure across Asia, Africa, Europe, and beyond.[41] The initiative seeks to boost economic growth by facilitating trade and investment while expanding China’s geopolitical influence through financial partnerships. However, it has faced criticism for creating debt dependency among smaller economies, lacking transparency, and raising environmental concerns.[42]
China’s BRI has expanded into Latin America, focusing on infrastructure, energy, and trade partnerships. Since its conception in 2013, the Chinese BRI has been primarily focused on industry and infrastructure development in underdeveloped countries. Countries like Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela have signed agreements under the initiative. Key projects include ports, highways, railways, and energy investments, such as the Bioceanic Railway Corridor, which aims to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru. China has also invested in renewable energy, funding solar and wind farms in Argentina and Chile and hydroelectric projects in Ecuador. These industrial initiatives also benefit Chinese interests in raw natural resources, such as soy, copper, and lithium.
China’s infrastructure projects are particularly attractive to Latin American countries because, unlike USAID, there is a heavier focus on infrastructure investment to help countries become more economically self-sufficient and competitive in the global market.[43] However, the BRI barely addresses humanitarian issues facing the region, such as environmental degradation or the protection of marginalized populations.[44] This lack of oversight raises serious concerns about long-term sustainability, as projects often proceed without adequate safeguards for indigenous rights, ecological preservation, or equitable development.[45] Moreover, many BRI-funded projects have saddled participating countries with substantial debt burdens, often tied to opaque terms and insufficiently productive assets.[46] In contrast, USAID—despite its flaws—has historically attempted to fill this humanitarian gap, supporting social programs and environmental initiatives that prioritize vulnerable communities.[47] As BRI expands, the absence of such protections risks deepening inequality and eroding democratic and ecological resilience, underscoring the urgent need for the U.S. to preserve a reformed, principled version of its foreign aid presence
Many critics argue that China’s growing influence in Latin America undermines regional sovereignty, stability, and development.[48] Through aggressive economic diplomacy, China encourages nations to abandon diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in exchange for financial incentives, such as large-scale infrastructure investments or debt relief.[49] Peru is a notable example, where Chinese state-owned companies gained control over the electric grid in Lima and secured major construction contracts, sometimes through questionable procurement practices.[50] Furthermore, Argentina’s controversial agreement to host a Chinese space station and Brazil’s reliance on Chinese companies in critical sectors further exemplify the growing dependence on Chinese financial contribution.[51] These projects often come with hidden costs: corruption, lack of transparency, and environmental damage, such as deforestation linked to mining and energy projects.[52] Critics of China’s engagement claim that it fosters long-term economic dependency while eroding democratic norms and local autonomy across the region.[53]
In light of the Trump administration’s drastic foreign aid cuts and the shifting global landscape, the future of U.S. influence in Latin America hangs in the balance. USAID, though imperfect and politically entangled, has served for decades as a key vehicle of American soft power, delivering vital humanitarian and development support while countering authoritarian and anti-democratic forces. Its abrupt defunding risks creating a power vacuum that China is already poised to fill with its Belt and Road Initiative—an effort that prioritizes infrastructure and resource extraction, often at the expense of transparency, environmental sustainability, and democratic governance. If the U.S. truly seeks to safeguard its strategic interests and uphold its international commitments to democracy, human rights, and regional stability, it must act swiftly to reform, not dismantle, USAID. By reimagining foreign aid policy to be both ethically grounded and geopolitically strategic, the U.S. can reclaim its role as a constructive force in Latin America that uplifts vulnerable populations while protecting long-term national and regional interests in the face of rising global competition.
[1] Team WOLA, What Trump’s Second Term Might Mean for Latin America, WOLA (Jan. 16, 2025), https://www.wola.org/analysis/what-trumps-second-term-might-mean-for-latin-america/.
[2] Wade Warren, USAID at 60: An Enduring Purpose, A Complex Legacy, AFSA (Nov. 2021), https://afsa.org/usaid-60-enduring-purpose-complex-legacy.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Clarisa Diaz, Trump’s USAID Chief Accused of Imperialism, Worldcrunch (Apr. 2020), https://worldcrunch.com/eyes-on-the-us/trump-usaid-imperialism/.
[6] Id.
[7] Joshua Kurlantzick, U.S. Soft Power Is Spiraling. In Asia, China Is Filling the Void., Council on Foreign Relations (Apr. 8, 2024), https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-soft-power-spiraling-asia-china-filling-void.
[8] Id.
[9] The White House, Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid, WhiteHouse.gov (Jan. 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/reevaluating-and-realigning-united-states-foreign-aid/.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Nurith Aizenman, Rubio Announces That 83% of USAID Contracts Will Be Canceled, NPR (Mar. 10, 2025), https://www.npr.org/sections/goats-and-soda/2025/03/10/g-s1-52964/rubio-announces-that-83-of-usaid-contracts-will-be-canceled.
[13] Supra note 5.
[14] Exec. Order No. 10,973, 3 C.F.R. 642 (1961), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-10973-administration-foreign-assistance-and-related-functions.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Pew Research Center, What the Data Says About U.S. Foreign Aid, Pew Research (Feb. 6, 2025), https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/02/06/what-the-data-says-about-us-foreign-aid/.
[18] Associated Press, USAID Is Going Away. Here’s What It’s Been Doing in South America, AP News (2025), https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2025/usaid-is-going-away-heres-what-its-been-doing-in-south-america/.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Laura Carlsen, The Demise of USAID: Few Regrets in Latin America, CounterPunch (Feb. 17, 2025), https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/02/17/the-demise-of-usaid-few-regrets-in-latin-america/.
[23] Id.
[24] Darragh Roche, Trump and Musk: The Unexpected Ally in Push to Shut Down USAID, Newsweek (2025), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-musk-unexpected-ally-push-shut-down-usaid-2026231.
[25] Id.
[26] Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 53. Starvation as a Method of Warfare, ICRC (2025), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule53.
[27] Paul D. Williams, United Nations and Peace Operations, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (2022), https://oxfordre.com/politics/politics/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-332.
[28] Id.
[29] Council on Foreign Relations, What Is Soft Power?, CFR Education (2025), https://education.cfr.org/learn/reading/what-soft-power.
[30] Philip Alston, International Human Rights: Text and Materials 820–846, 821 (NYU Law 2024).
[31] Id.
[32] Id. at 21.
[33] Id.
[34] U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Office of Inspector Gen., OIG Oversight: Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, https://oig.usaid.gov/dem-human-gov (last visited Apr. 24, 2025).
[35] Supra note 29.
[36] Supra note 32.
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39] Supra note 6.
[40] Id.
[41] Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative, Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
[42] Id.
[43] Supra note 6.
[44] 3GIMBALS, The Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America: A Strategic Analysis of Economic Exploitation and Debt Diplomacy, https://3gimbals.com/insights/the-belt-and-road-initiative-in-latin-america-a-strategic-analysis-of-economic-exploitation-and-debt-diplomacy/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2025).
[45] Id.
[46] Id.
[47] Isabella Lapadula, Four Ways the USAID Funding Freeze Is Impacting in Latin America, Latin Am. Reps. (Feb. 24, 2025), https://latinamericareports.com/four-ways-the-usaid-funding-freeze-is-impacting-in-latin-america/10769/.
[48] Diálogo, China’s Influence Destroys Latin America, Diálogo Americas (2025), https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/chinas-influence-destroys-latin-america/.
[49] Id.
[50] Id.
[51] Id.
[52] Id.
[53] Supra note 45.
