Introduction: A Crisis Beneath the Soil
Across Ghana’s forests and rivers, a silent crisis unfolds—one fueled by desperation, corruption, and the relentless pursuit of gold.[1] Illegal Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (“ASGM”) – known locally as “galamsey”—has left entire landscapes barren and water sources poisoned by mercury.[2] Once-vital rivers are now contaminated, while millions in potential government revenue are lost to smuggling networks.[3]
Beyond environmental and economic damage, illegal ASGM represents a governance failure.[4] Weak enforcement of Ghana’s Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 has allowed corruption and regulatory gaps to sustain the illicit gold trade.[5] In response, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”) developed a framework targeting organized crime in the mineral sector, integrating tools from the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (“UNTOC”) and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (“UNCAC”), both to which Ghana is a ratifying nation.[6] However, these conventions, designed to combat traditional organized crime and bribery, fail to account for the decentralized nature of illegal ASGM.[7]
This article will analyze the limitations of Ghana’s domestic laws in addressing illegal ASGM and assess the applicability of UNTOC’s transnational crime framework.[8] It will examine UNCAC’s role in tackling corruption and whether its provisions can curb bribery in Ghana’s mining sector.[9] Additionally, it will evaluate Ghana’s obligations under international environmental treaties, particularly its National Action Plan under the Minamata Convention, which seeks to eliminate mercury use, despite its continued prevalence.[10] Finally, the discussion will propose solutions that include legal reforms, enhanced international enforcement, and sustainable economic alternatives to illegal mining. By analyzing successful case studies from other gold-producing nations, this article will outline a roadmap for Ghana to reform its mining sector while ensuring economic stability and environmental protection.[11]
Limits of Ghana’s Domestic Legal Framework
Ghana’s legal framework for regulating mining activities is primarily governed by the Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 (“the Act”), which outlines licensing requirements, environmental protections, and penalties for illegal mining operations.[12] Despite its comprehensive provisions, enforcement remains weak, allowing illegal ASGM to flourish.[13] While the Act criminalizes unauthorized mining and prescribes penalties, its enforcement is plagued by corruption, lack of resources, and legal loopholes.[14] As a result, illegal ASGM operations persist, undermining formal mining regulations and contributing to environmental destruction.[15]
Given the transnational nature of gold smuggling, Ghana’s illegal ASGM problem might seem to fall within the scope of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.[16] UNTOC provides a framework for combatting organized crime across borders, requiring state parties to criminalize offenses committed by organized criminal groups and establish cooperative measures for law enforcement.[17] However, the decentralized and informal nature of ASGM in Ghana presents a major challenge to UNTOC’s applicability.[18]
UNTOC and Informality: The Incompatibility of ASGM with Traditional Crime Frameworks
UNTOC defines an “organized criminal group” as a structured entity of three or more persons acting together for financial gain through criminal activities.[19] This definition assumes a level of hierarchy and coordination that does not align with how illegal ASGM functions in Ghana.[20] Unlike drug cartels or human trafficking rings, many ASGM operations are run by loosely connected individuals or small, informal networks of miners, buyers, and smugglers.[21] While some elements of the gold smuggling trade involve sophisticated criminal syndicates, the majority of illegal miners in Ghana do not fit the structural criteria for an “organized criminal group” outlined by UNTOC.[22]
Further, UNTOC’s “serious crime” threshold requires that offenses carry a penalty of at least four years of imprisonment to qualify.[23] Under Ghana’s Minerals and Mining Act of 2006, penalties for illegal mining vary, with some offenses carrying fines rather than custodial sentences; many sentences fall under the “serious crime” threshold.[24] While recent amendments have sought to increase penalties, inconsistent enforcement and judicial corruption have weakened the deterrent effect of these provisions.[25] This discrepancy in sentencing makes it difficult to classify illegal ASGM as a UNTOC-related offense.[26]
Moreover, UNTOC requires states to implement mutual legal assistance mechanisms and cross-border law enforcement cooperation, but Ghana’s approach to illegal ASGM remains primarily domestic.[27] While illegal gold exports from Ghana have been linked to international smuggling routes, the Ghanaian government has struggled to engage in transnational enforcement efforts effectively.[28] Ghana’s strategies have focused largely on internal policy reforms and local enforcement, with minimal emphasis on international coordination or cross-border initiatives.[29] This limited engagement is due in part to institutional and resource constraints, including insufficient technical capacity and the complexities of participating in multilateral enforcement networks.[30] The informal nature of illegal mining, combined with the absence of clear transnational enforcement mechanisms, limits the effectiveness of applying UNTOC to this crisis.[31]
By contrast, the UNODC Response Framework takes a more nuanced approach to mineral-related crime; UNODC recognizes that illegal ASGM is often driven by socio-economic factors and weak governance, rather than traditional organized crime structures.[32] The framework suggests tailored strategies that include community-based interventions, improved traceability measures, and financial transparency regulations.[33] Rather than attempting to apply UNTOC’s rigid legal definitions to informal mining networks, the response framework emphasizes capacity-building initiatives, environmental governance, and responsible sourcing policies to address the root causes of illegal ASGM.[34]
While UNTOC remains a powerful tool against transnational organized crime, its rigid definitions and structural requirements render it largely inapplicable to combatting Ghana’s illegal ASGM crisis.[35] Instead, a more adaptable legal and enforcement strategy, informed by the UNODC Response Framework, is necessary to tackle the challenges posed by informal mining and its associated environmental and economic consequences.[36]
Comparing UNCAC to the Ghanaian ASGM Crisis: Corruption as a Key Enabler
Illegal ASGM in Ghana is not only sustained by weak regulatory enforcement, but by corruption at multiple levels of governance.[37] Corruption facilitates the illicit gold trade by enabling miners to evade prosecution, secure fraudulent mining permits, and smuggle gold out of the country with little oversight.[38] The United Nations Convention against Corruption, designed to combat systemic corruption, provides a framework that is likely more applicable to Ghana’s ASGM crisis than UNTOC.[39]
UNCAC requires state parties to establish preventive anti-corruption policies, enforce criminal penalties, and enhance transparency in public administration.[40] In Ghana, however, these measures remain largely ineffective in the mining sector due to deeply-entrenched bribery and regulatory loopholes.[41] Although Ghana has anti-corruption bodies like the Economic and Organized Crime Office (“EOCO”) and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (“CHRAJ”), these institutions often lack the political will and resources to enforce laws effectively.[42]
One of UNCAC’s core provisions is the criminalization of bribery in the public and private sectors; this is particularly relevant given that illicit ASGM thrives on corrupt dealings between miners and local officials.[43] Many illegal miners avoid penalties by paying bribes to law enforcement officers, allowing their activities to continue unchecked.[44] Ghana’s legal system does not effectively deter such practices, as cases of corruption in the extractive sector are rarely prosecuted to the fullest extent.[45] Strengthening Ghana’s enforcement of UNCAC’s anti-bribery provisions could play a critical role in mitigating illegal ASGM, thereby increasing accountability among regulatory authorities.[46]
Additionally, UNCAC promotes international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting corruption-related offenses; this could aid Ghana in addressing the global networks that facilitate gold smuggling.[47] By enhancing transparency in the trade of precious metals and increasing collaboration with international financial crime watchdogs, Ghana could disrupt the illicit flow of gold.[48] This would require Ghana to significantly reform its anti-corruption institutions and introduce stricter oversight mechanisms in the mining sector.[49]
In comparison, UNCAC provides a stronger legal foundation than UNTOC for addressing Ghana’s illegal ASGM crisis, due to its focus on corruption; its effectiveness is contingent on Ghana’s ability to enforce anti-corruption measures rigorously.
The Incompatibility of Ghana’s Illegal Gold Trade with International Law
Beyond corruption and weak enforcement, Ghana’s illegal ASGM crisis is also at odds with several aspects of international law, particularly regarding the trafficking of precious metals and environmental governance.[50] Illegal gold smuggling fuels money laundering, tax evasion, and transnational crime, while undermining formal markets and legal mining operations.[51] Despite being one of the world’s largest gold producers, Ghana has struggled to ensure that its gold supply chain is free from illicit activities; much of its illegally mined gold finds its way to international markets without proper documentation.[52]
The Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) is one of the key international frameworks addressing this issue. The Task Force recognizes gold as a high-risk commodity for money laundering and illicit financial flows.[53] However, Ghana’s domestic policies do not align with FATF recommendations for financial transparency in gold transactions, making it difficult to track illicit flows of gold and prevent it from entering the formal economy.[54] This misalignment stems from weak enforcement of anti-money laundering measures among gold dealers, limited regulatory oversight, and low effectiveness in applying FATF’s recommendations within the sector.[55] Further, Ghana has not fully adopted blockchain or digital tracking mechanisms for gold exports, which are becoming industry standards for preventing fraudulent transactions.[56]
The environmental dimension of illegal ASGM presents another critical area where Ghana’s policies are misaligned with international obligations.[57] The Minamata Convention on Mercury, which Ghana has ratified, seeks to reduce mercury pollution and eliminate its use in small-scale gold mining.[58] Despite Ghana’s commitment to the treaty, mercury use remains widespread in illegal ASGM, leading to severe environmental and public health risks.[59] In addition to its contaminating effects on water sources and soil, mercury exposes mining communities to long-term neurological disorders.[60]
Ghana’s National Action Plan (“NAP”), under the Minamata Convention, outlines strategies for reducing mercury use, like transitioning miners to mercury-free processing methods and enhancing monitoring mechanisms.[61] However, implementation remains weak due to limited government funding and enforcement capacity.[62] Without stronger regulatory oversight and investment in sustainable mining technologies, Ghana risks violating its commitments under the Minamata Convention while continuing to endanger local populations and ecosystems.[63]
Ghana’s failure to regulate mercury use also contradicts the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, which governs the disposal of toxic substances.[64] Mercury waste from illegal mining often finds its way into rivers, contaminating ecosystems and affecting biodiversity in ways that violate the Basel Convention’s principles on hazardous waste management.[65] Despite being a signatory, Ghana has not fully integrated Basel Convention requirements into its mining laws, resulting in ongoing environmental degradation.[66]
Addressing these gaps requires a comprehensive approach that integrates stricter gold trade monitoring, better financial regulations, and enhanced environmental protections.[67] Without such measures, Ghana’s illegal ASGM sector will continue to violate international legal norms while exacerbating economic, environmental, and public health crises.[68]
Addressing Ghana’s Illegal Mining Crisis: Legal and Economic Solutions
The persistence of illegal ASGM in Ghana reflects a broader failure of both domestic and international enforcement mechanisms. To effectively combat this crisis, Ghana must synthesize its domestic mining laws with global legal frameworks such as the UNTOC and the UNCAC.[69] Strengthening enforcement within Ghana’s Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 and aligning it with these conventions will ensure stricter penalties for offenders and improved regulatory oversight.[70] Currently, weak penalties and inconsistent enforcement have allowed illegal mining to thrive, with bribery and corruption undermining efforts to prosecute offenders.[71] A restructured legal framework must incorporate stronger criminal provisions, asset forfeiture mechanisms, and enhanced law enforcement coordination to effectively deter illegal ASGM.[72]
One of the primary gaps in Ghana’s enforcement strategy is the lack of international monitoring and enforcement mechanisms targeting illicit gold trade.[73] To address this, Ghana should advocate for the creation of an international gold tracking system modeled after existing frameworks, such as the Kimberley Process for Conflict Diamonds.[74] Implementing digital tracking for gold exports and requiring detailed documentation from all buyers would significantly reduce smuggling and ensure compliance with international standards.[75]
Beyond legal reforms, increased foreign direct investment (“FDI”) and structured bilateral or multilateral agreements could provide a sustainable alternative to illegal mining.[76] Ghana should encourage responsible multinational mining corporations to invest in regulated ASGM operations, providing employment opportunities while ensuring environmental sustainability.[77] By establishing public-private partnerships, the government can implement programs to transition illegal miners into legal operations through financial incentives and training initiatives.[78] Countries like Peru have succeeded with such formalization efforts; this demonstrates that integrating ASGM into a regulated framework can reduce environmental damage while sustaining economic growth.[79]
Further, enhanced environmental protections are necessary to ensure Ghana complies with international agreements like the Minamata Convention on Mercury and the Basel Convention on Hazardous Waste.[80] The Ghanaian government must fully implement its National Action Plan under the Minamata Convention, phasing out mercury use through the promotion of alternative mining technologies and implementation of stricter regulations on mercury imports.[81] Increased environmental monitoring and stricter penalties for mercury pollution will help Ghana fulfill its obligations under these conventions while mitigating long-term public health risks.[82]
Addressing illegal ASGM in Ghana requires a multi-faceted approach that combines legal reforms, international enforcement cooperation, economic investment, and environmental protection. By integrating UNTOC and UNCAC provisions into its domestic laws, implementing gold tracking mechanisms, encouraging FDI in the formal mining sector, and enforcing environmental treaties, Ghana can combat illegal ASGM more effectively. The experiences of other gold-producing nations highlight that reforming the sector is both feasible and necessary to protect Ghana’s economy, natural resources, and international standing.[83] Without decisive action, the environmental and economic consequences of illegal mining will continue to worsen, making urgent reform efforts a national and global priority.[84]
[1] Emmanuel Yamoah Tenkorang & Prisca Kodua, The Impact of Illegal Mining on the Ghanaian Economy, 2020 J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 45.
[2] ISS Africa, Ghana Must Stop Galamsey Before It Sinks the Country, 2023 https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ghana-must-stop-galamsey-before-it-sinks-the-country (last visited Mar. 08, 2025).
[3] ENACT Africa, Illegal Mining Digs Up Multiple Problems in Ghana, ENACT Observer (Mar. 2023), https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/illegal-mining-digs-up-multiple-problems-in-ghana (last visited Mar. 08, 2025).
[4] Christian Akorlie, Ghana’s Wildcat Gold Mining Booms, Poisoning People and Nature, Reuters (Oct. 7, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/ghanas-wildcat-gold-mining-booms-poisoning-people-nature-2024-10-07/ (last visited Mar. 08, 2025).
[5] Ghana Minerals and Mining Act, 2006, Act 703 [hereinafter Mining Act].
[6] UNODC, UNODC Response Framework on Illegal Mining and the Illicit Trafficking in Precious Metals, 2023 [hereinafter UNODC Response Framework]; UNTOC, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; UNCAC, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41).
[7] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Illegal Mining, UNODC, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/environment-climate/illegal-mining.html (last visited Mar. 08, 2025) [hereinafter UNODC Illegal Mining].
[8] UNTOC, supra note 6, Art. 2(a).
[9] UNCAC, supra note 6, Art. 5
[10] Environmental Protection Agency, Republic of Ghana, National Action Plan: Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining in Ghana (2020), https://minamataconvention.org/en/documents/national-action-plan-ghana-2020.
[11] World Bank, Mining Together: Large-Scale Mining Meets Artisanal Mining, A Guide for Action (2010).
[12] Mining Act, supra note 5 at 5.
[13] ICLG, Mining Laws and Regulations Ghana 2025 (2024), https://iclg.com/practice-areas/mining-laws-and-regulations/ghana.
[14] Akorlie, supra note 4.
[15] ISS Africa, supra note 2.
[16] UNTOC, supra note 6, Art. 1.
[17] Id. at Art. 5.
[18] UNODC Illegal Mining, supra note 7.
[19] UNTOC, supra note 6, Art. 2(a).
[20] UNODC Response Framework, supra note 6, at 4.
[21] Global Initiative, Pulling at Golden Webs: Combating Criminal Consortia in African Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining and Trade Sector, (2019) https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/pulling-at-golden-webs/ (last visited Mar. 08, 2025).
[22] Id.
[23] UNTOC, supra note 6, Art. 2(b).
[24] Mining Act, supra note 5, at §99.
[25] ICLG, supra note 13.
[26] UNODC Illegal Mining, supra note 7.
[27] UNTOC, supra, Art. 18; Mark L. Wilson et al., Integrated Assessment of Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining in Ghana—Part 3: Social Sciences and Economics, 12 Int’l J. Envtl. Res. & Pub. Health 8133, 8138–39 (2015), https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/12/7/8133.
[28] Enact AFRICA, supra note 3.
[29] Watson Farley & Williams, INDABA 2025: How Can Ghana Combat Illegal Mining?, WFW.com (Feb. 18, 2025), https://www.wfw.com/articles/indaba-2025-how-can-ghana-combat-illegal-mining/.
[30] Id.
[31] Enact AFRICA, supra note 3.
[32] UNODC Response Framework, supra note 6, at 4.
[33] Id. at 6.
[34] Id. at 7.
[35] UNTOC, supra note 6, at 12.
[36] UNODC Response Framework, supra note 6, at 3.
[37] Ngala Killian Chimtom, Ghana Bishops Blast Government for ‘Weak, Corrupt’ Efforts to Halt Illegal Mining, Crux (Sept. 16, 2024), https://cruxnow.com/church-in-africa/2024/09/ghana-bishops-blast-government-for-weak-corrupt-efforts-to-halt-illegal-mining/ (Last Visited March 09, 2015).
[38] ISS Africa, supra note 2.
[39] UNCAC, supra note 6, at 6.
[40] UNCAC, supra note 6, Art. 5
[41] ICLG, supra note 13.
[42] Global Initiative, supra note 21, at 5.
[43] UNCAC, supra note 6, Art. 15; INTERPOL, Illegal Gold Mining in Central Africa 28 (2021), https://www.interpol.int/content/download/16493/file/2021%2007%2027%20ENGLISH%20PUBLIC%20VERSION_FINAL_Illegal%20gold%20mining%20in%20Central%20Africa.pdf (last visited March 09, 2025).
[44] INTERPOL, supra note 43 at 23.
[45] ISS Africa, supra note 2.
[46] UNCAC, supra note 6, Art. 36.
[47] Id. at Art. 43.
[48] Global Financial Integrity & Integrated Social Development Centre, Mapping of Illicit Financial Flows Risks Along the Supply Chain of Gold Mining in Ghana (2025), https://gfintegrity.org/press-release/new-report-uncovers-illicit-financial-flow-risks-in-ghanas-gold-mining-supply-chain/ [hereinafter Mapping of Illicit Financial Flows].
[49] ICLG, supra note 13.
[50] Global Initiative, supra note 21 at 5.
[51] Mapping of Illicit Financial Flows, supra note 46.
[52] ISS Africa, supra note 2.
[53] Financial Action Task Force, “Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks from Gold,” 2015.
[54] Id.
[55] Id. at 21-25.
[56] ICLG, supra note 13; Reuters, London Bullion Association Launches Digital Database for Gold Bars (Jan. 29, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/london-bullion-association-launches-digital-database-gold-bars-2025-01-29/ (Last visited March 09, 2025).
[57] United Nations Env’t Programme, Global Mercury Assessment 2018 (2019), https://www.unep.org/resources/publication/global-mercury-assessment-2018.
[58] Minamata Convention on Mercury, Oct. 10, 2013, 55 I.L.M. 582.
[59] Ghana, National Action Plan on Mercury in the Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Sector, Minamata Convention on Mercury (Apr. 21, 2022), https://minamataconvention.org/en/documents/national-action-plan-ghana-2020 [hereinafter Ghana NAP].
[60] United Nations Env’t Programme, Global Mercury Assessment 2018 (2019), https://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/27579.
[61] Ghana NAP, supra note 55 at 32.
[62] Id. at 32-33.
[63] Minamata Convention, supra note 54, Art. 7.
[64] Basel Convention, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126.
[65] Id. at 8.
[66] Compare Id. with ICLG, supra note 13.
[67] Global Initiative, supra note 21.
[68] See generally Id.
[69] UNTOC, supra note 6; UNCAC, supra note 6.
[70] Mining Act, supra note 5, §99.
[71] ISS Africa, supra note 2.
[72] ICLG, supra note 13.
[73] Global Initiative, supra note 21.
[74] G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (Jan. 29, 2001).
[75] Reuters, supra note 53.
[76] Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment 10 (2002) [hereinafter FDI and Environment].
[77] ISS Africa, supra note 2.
[78] Id.
[79] FDI and Environment, supra note 71 at 13.
[80] Minamata Convention, supra note 54; Basel Convention, supra note 60.
[81] See generally Ghana NAP, supra note 55.
[82] Global Mercury Assessment, supra note 56.
[83] See generally FDI and Environment, supra note 71.
[84] ISS Africa, supra note 2.
