The rapid development of China’s mass surveillance technology falls under the guise of enhanced public security.[1] However, the surveillance serves as the primary measure to commit human rights abuses, particularly against Uyghur Muslims,[2] a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority community in Northwest China.[3] Uyghurs practicing Islam trace their roots back to the influence of the Karakhanid dynasty, a Turkish ruling power in Central Asia between the 9th and 13th centuries.[4] Today, 12 million Uyghurs make up nearly half of the population in Xinjiang and are subjected to “ruthless persecution” by the Chinese government, mainly through the use of surveillance technology.[5] Deployment of facial recognition software, artificial intelligence (“AI”), and internet data collection to identify “suspicious persons” paves the way for China to locate and imprison what it considers “problematic Uyghurs.”[6] In 2020, for example, the Chinese Communist Party enacted a counter-extremism policy to identify “extremist behaviors” among public citizens, but such “extremist behaviors” included growing beards, wearing headscarves, fasting during the month of Ramadan, or selling or reading the Quran.[7] Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and The Uyghur Human Rights Project are among the many organizations raising concerns over the global proliferation of such technologies, especially as other authoritarian nations continue to purchase surveillance technologies from China.[8]
Despite the international framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement (“WA”), aiming to regulate the transfer of dual-use technologies[9] (technology governments use for both civilian and military purposes[10]), the WA is insufficient to address the global export and normalization of surveillance technologies. While China is not a member party to the WA, key purchasers of China’s technologies – including the United States, United Kingdom, India, and the Russian Federation – are member nations.[11]To combat the increasing global influence of China’s discriminatory surveillance state, all forty-two WA member countries must implement stricter export controls on dual-use technologies to prevent human rights abuses and urge non-member countries to adhere to these norms. Countries may then feel pressured to comply with the WA to avoid global isolation and economic loss.
As the largest global producer of mass surveillance technology[12], China’s widespread monitoring makes up 54% of all 770 million cameras worldwide.[13] After the September 11th attacks in the United States, rising Islamophobia and the subsequent War on Terror led China to link Uyghur identity with extremism and terrorism[14] while framing its policies as a “social need for security… .”[15] Uyghur Muslims have resided in China’s northwest region for centuries but continue to face the enduring challenges of “forced integration” with the Han Chinese at the hands of the Communist Party.[16] In response to the Uyghurs’ resistance against cultural and religious repression, China’s Communist Party leaders planned to use surveillance equipment “to exert control over an ethnic minority population” in 2016.[17] That year, the Chinese government implemented the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (“IJOP”) program that compiles data from cameras, checkpoints, and mobile data to track and flag people’s “extremist behaviors,” as discussed above.[18]Since then, China has integrated its network of video surveillance with AI, thereby surveilling 12 million Uyghur Muslims, “of which nearly 1 million have been displaced into camps.”[19] The facial recognition software and drones identify “problematic Uyghurs” who are imprisoned in “re-education” camps “for reasons as simple as practicing their religion, having international contracts or communications, or attending a Western university.”[20] With the assistance of Chinese and international technology companies, mass surveillance has now extended to “detention facilities and outside of them” as another tactic to instill fear among Uyghurs.[21] China intends to erase all traces of Uyghur roots by placing thousands into concentration camps, where Uyghurs face forced sterilization[22] or forced consumption of pork and alcohol.[23]
Established in 1996, the WA remains the sole international agreement featuring a transnational legal framework aimed at limiting the export of surveillance equipment, software, and technical expertise.[24] The purpose of the WA is to foster transparency and accountability in the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use technologies, in addition to deterring terrorists from purchasing these items.[25] Under the WA, a “Munitions List” defines which technologies are strictly meant for military use.[26] However, facial recognition systems, drones, AI algorithms, and data collection software – technologies central to China’s surveillance network in Xinjiang – do not explicitly fall under the Munitions List. In turn, the exportation of surveillance technologies to non-member states, like China, lacks sufficient oversight from the WA. Additionally, the WA framework provides guidelines on “export controls governing arms as well as dual-use goods and technologies,” but such guidelines are non-binding.[27] This means member countries are not bound to implement the WA guidelines within their domestic regimes[28], leaving significant gaps in global regulation.
The WA’s flaws have become apparent in light of China’s global influence of surveillance technology. Notably, the WA fails to keep pace with China’s rapidly evolving spyware and AI tools that scan millions of people’s physical characteristics to detect Uyghur Muslims.[29] Without clearer definitions of what qualifies as a dual-use surveillance technology, the WA risks become futile in the face of persisting technological advancements.[30] These technologies are now being exported to other nations, permitting authoritarian regimes to replicate China’s model of discriminatory surveillance.[31] Zimbabwe, for instance, purchased China’s CloudWalk Technology, an AI-linked facial recognition software used to monitor public spaces. Yet this purchased software opens the door for easy targeting and discrimination, especially when the ZANU-PF, Zimbabwe’s ruling party, has historically persecuted political opposition organizations and human rights defenders.[32] Further, the non-binding nature of the WA enables weak enforcement mechanisms and encourages countries like China and other non-member nations to continue harming communities on a widespread level.[33] Thus, WA member nations must take collective action to prevent the spread of China’s surveillance model. For example, member nations should conduct impact assessments before exporting surveillance technologies, ensuring that governments do not misuse the purchased surveillance tools to oppress minority groups or suppress dissent. Member nations can also advocate for diplomacy, sanctions, trade agreements, and public accountability to pressure non-member countries to comply with WA principles. If successful, non-compliant countries could risk economic and diplomatic isolation if they disregard international surveillance technology norms.
Member nations must urgently reform the WA to address the rapidly developing landscape of surveillance technologies. They must extend the Arrangement’s regulations so facial recognition software, drones, AI algorithms, and data collection systems constitute dual-use technologies, subject to strict export controls. Moreover, member nations should leverage diplomatic and economic measures to pressure non-member states to follow international norms and prevent human rights abuses through mass surveillance. By enforcing stricter measures and holding non-compliant nations accountable through sanctions or trade restrictions, the WA – and its member nations – can take a stronger stance in preventing the spread of China’s discriminatory surveillance model and safeguarding human rights worldwide.
[1] Dahlia Peterson, How China harnesses data fusion to make sense of surveillance data, Brookings Institution (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-china-harnesses-data-fusion-to-make-sense-of-surveillance-data/.
[2] How mass surveillance works in Xinjiang, The Xinjiang Data Project and Human Rights Watch (Apr. 2019), https://xjdp.aspi.org.au/explainers/how-mass-surveillance-works-in-xinjiang/.
[3] Amnesty Int’l, China’s Uighur Muslims: The Truth Behind the Headlines, (Mar. 15, 2024), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/chinas-uighur-muslims-truth-behind-headlines.
[4] Ted Regencia, What you should now about China’s minority Uighurs, Al Jazeera (July 8, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/8/uighurs-timeline.
[5] Amnesty Int’l, supra at 4.
[6] Brandon Mickelsen, Comment: China’s Moonshot: How The Introduction of The Digital Renminbi Furthers China’s Societal Grip and Threatens the Future of Digital Currencies, 15 U. St. Thomas J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 813, 848-49 (2022).
[7] U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, International Religious Freedom Report 30, 90 (2020).
[8]How Mass Surveillance Works in Xinjiang, China, Human Rights Watch (May 2, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2019/05/02/china-how-mass-surveillance-works-xinjiang; Amnesty Int’l, EU companies selling surveillance tools to China’s human rights abusers, Press Release (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/09/eu-surveillance-sales-china-human-rights-abusers/; Aidan Gouley, Global Challenge Uyghur Women’s Rights Defenders & Intrusive Surveillance Technologies, UyghurHuman Rights Project (Mar. 22, 2023), https://uhrp.org/news/global-challenge-uyghur-womens-rights-defenders-intrusive-surveillance-technologies/; Omar Shakir, Mass Surveillance Fueld Oppression of Uyghurs and Palestinians, Al Jazeera (Nov. 24, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/11/24/mass-surveillance-fuels-oppression-of-uyghurs-and-palestinians.
[9] Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 1 (Dec. 2019) 1, 4.
[10] Exporting dual-use items, European Commission, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help-exporters-and-importers/exporting-dual-use-items_en.
[11] Id.
[12] Zeyi Yang, The world’s biggest surveillance company you’ve never heard of, MIT Technology Review (June 22, 2022), https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/06/22/1054586/hikvision-worlds-biggest-surveillance-company/#:~:text=Its%20ability%20to%20make%20decent,surveillance%20equipment%20in%20the%20world.
[13] Megan Gates, The Rise of the Surveillance State, ASIS International (June 2021), https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/monthly-issues/security-technology/archive/2021/june/The-Rise-of-The-Surveillance-State/.
[14] Kristian Petersen, How 9/11 helped China wage its own false ‘war on terror’, Al Jazeera (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/9/8/how-9-11-helped-china-wage-its-own-false-war-on.
[15] Mark Packulak, Who Watches the Watchers: Oversight of State Surveillance, 45 Man. L.J. 101, 119.
[16] Mickelsen, supra note 2 at 847.
[17] Josh Chin & Liza Lin, Surveillance State: Inside China’s Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control, 32 (2022).
[18] China’s Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App, Human Rights Watch (May 1, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass.
[19] Packulak, supra note 9 at 120.
[20] Mickelsen, supra note 2 at 848-49; Chinese Persecution of the Uyghurs, United States Holocaust Memorial Musem (last visited Oct. 20, 2024), https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/china/chinese-persecution-of-the-uyghurs.
[21] Johana Bhuiyan, ‘There’s cameras everywhere’: testimonies detail far-reaching surveillance of Uyghurs in China, The Guardian (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/30/uyghur-tribunal-testimony-surveillance-china.
[22] Mickelsen, supra note 2 at 848.
[23] Ted Regencia, Uighurs forced to eat pork as China expands Xinjiang pig farms, Al Jazeera (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/4/holduighurs-forced-to-eat-pork-as-hog-farming-in-xinjiang-expands.
[24] Kim Heejin, Global Export Controls of Cyber Surveillance Technology and the Disrupted Triangular Dialogue, 70 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 379, 415 (2021).
[25] Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, supra note 4 at 4.
[26] Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies: List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, 2 (2023) 1, 214.
[27] Heejin, supra note 25 at 415.
[28] Kotaro Shiojiri, Regional Focus & Controversies: Export Control of Semiconductor Materials: Japan’s Measures on Export Control to the Republic of Korea: From the Perspective of International Law, 12 JEAIL 337, 338.
[29] Heejin, supra note 25 at 415.
[30] Id.
[31] Kaan Sahin, The West, China, and AI surveillance, Atlantic Council (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/geotech-cues/the-west-china-and-ai-surveillance/.
[32] Farai Mutsaka, Zimbabwe government harasses opposition with arrests, jail, Associate Press (Sept. 3, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/inflation-elections-zimbabwe-arrests-6c807a6022eee73eef23662ddd841a26.
[33] Heejin, supra note 25 at 415.
