In October 2023, the United Nations (“UN”) Security Council authorized a Multinational Security Support (“MSS”) mission to Haiti in response to escalating gang violence, instability, and political turmoil in the country.[1] In order to understand the present crisis in Haiti, it is important to consider its long struggle with development.
In January 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck Port-au-Prince, killing over 200,000 people and leaving the city in ruins, severely devastating both the population and the economy.[2] Throughout the 2010s, Haiti’s development was hindered further by escalating gang violence.[3] Since 2021, gangs competing for territory, resources, and power have killed over 100 police officers, reducing the Haitian National Police (“HNP”) force to fewer than 9,000 officers.[4] As a result, the HNP struggles to combat widespread gang violence, including murder, arson, and kidnapping.[5]
Political turmoil also plagues the country. In 2021, President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated by foreign mercenaries.[6] It remains unclear why the President was killed, but it may have been part of an unsuccessful plot to overthrow the government completely.[7] Prime Minister Ariel Henry took control and appealed to the international community for help in restoring order in Haiti.[8] However, many countries, including the United States, were hesitant to intervene due to past failed involvements.[9]
The most notable of these failures was the UN Stabilizing Mission in Haiti (“MINUSTAH”) established in 2004 to address gang violence and restructure the Haitian National Police.[10] The mission attempted to establish a secure and stable environmental, implement a constitutional and democratic political process, and protect human rights until 2017.[11] However, it did little to stabilize the country.[12] In fact, during its deployment, the mission triggered a cholera outbreak that killed over 10,000 people and faced accusations of sexual misconduct committed by UN peacekeepers.[13] These failures called into question the effectiveness of international intervention.
However, in 2023, Kenya offered to lead an MSS mission to Haiti and in October 2023, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2699, authorizing a Kenyan-led MSS mission to Haiti for a period of twelve months, funded by voluntary contributions from individual Member States and regional organizations.[14] Resolution 2699 invokes Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which permits the Security Council to take action in order to “maintain or restore international peace and security.”[15] Under Chapter VII, the Security Council has the authority to determine threats to peace and security, make recommendations to restore peace, and take military action if necessary.[16] However, Resolution 2699 does not cite a specific article under Chapter VII that specifically authorizes the intervention.
Despite invoking Chapter VII, the MSS does not undertake any of the action outlined in Chapter VII including making specific recommendations to restore peace or taking military action. Instead, Resolution 2699 authorizes Kenya to provide operational support to the Haitian National Police in efforts to combat violence and insecurity in Haiti.[17]
The first reason this mission is unconventional is that it delegates the Security Council’s intervention power to a third party.[18] Usually, under Chapter VII, the Security Council has the authority to intervene directly.[19] Second, the operation is to be carried out in cooperation with the HNP.[20] While Chapter VII does not mandate oversight by or cooperation with a national police force or military in security missions, the Security Council chose to make collaboration a requirement for the MSS.[21] Finally, Kenyan forces and the Haitian government are tasked with communicating the mission’s goals and rules of engagement.[22] Instead of the Security Council determining the goals, methods, and rules, as authorized in Chapter VII, the participating parties are granted this authority.[23]
As a result, the MSS is not a traditional UN peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII. It is an undefined operation that does not conform to the usual structure of UN-backed interventions.[24] This ambiguity calls into question not only what the MSS is, but what it intends to accomplish. The Security Council did not explain why it delegated its intervention authority to Kenya or define how the MSS should cooperate with the HNP.[25]
This ambiguity could undermine its effectiveness and have detrimental effects in Haiti. In 2024, before the MSS deployment, the situation in Haiti deteriorated significantly. In March 2024, gangs orchestrated a mass prison break and seized control of the international airport, preventing Prime Minister Henry from returning to the country.[26] This caused Henry to resign, leaving the country without elected leadership.[27] Throughout the year, over 5,000 people were killed and another 2,000 people were injured in gang-related violence.[28] Gangs have seized control of territory and illicit markets throughout the country, with many of them being aligned with Haitian politicians.[29]
Although the growing instability in Haiti heightened the need for intervention, the deployment of the MSS was delayed until June 2024 due to a lack of funding and organization.[30] Since then, funding for the MSS has failed to meet the estimated annual cost of approximately $600 million.[31] Additionally, only about 1,000 officers are currently deployed, despite planning for 2,500.[32] Without adequate funding and personnel, the MSS will not stand a chance against the powerful gangs. As a result, Haiti continues to grapple with gang violence and insecurity.[33] The Haitian National Police and MSS are “stretched thin” as they attempt to combat several gangs simultaneously.[34]
In October 2024, Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council, which was instated after Henry’s resignation, wrote to the Secretary-General requesting that the MSS be converted into a UN peacekeeping mission to increase its effectiveness.[35] In February 2025, the Secretary-General sent a letter to the Security Council denying the request due to the UN’s past failures in Haiti.[36]
It is evident that the international community’s trust in U.N. interventions in Haiti is significantly eroded due to the failure of the MINUSTAH. The Security Council’s hesitation to intervene directly under Chapter VII and its delegation of authority to Kenya reveals that while it acknowledges the need for intervention, it is unwilling to repeat past mistakes. While a noble goal, this hesitancy has significantly impacted the current MSS mission, resulting in delays and underfunding; and, as a result, limited success.
It has become clear that Haiti’s situation demands more direct intervention, such as a peacekeeping mission, to restore order and address the systemic issues that have plagued the country for decades. The MSS lacks the necessary resources, a clear mandate, and coordination to bring about any dramatic change. The failure of the mission to achieve its goals underscores the urgent need for a more comprehensive and robust international response—one that goes beyond the ambiguity and limitations of the current operation. Without such intervention, Haiti’s prospects for stability and recovery remain uncertain. The international community must reassess its efforts to effectively achieve peace.
[1] S.C. Res. 2699, ¶¶ 5-8, (Oct. 2, 2023).
[2] Bryan Pietsch, Crisis in Haiti comes after decades of turmoil: A chronology, The Washington Post, Mar. 16, 2024, at 2.
[3] The World Bank in Haiti, World Bank Group (Nov. 6, 2024), https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview.
[4] John D. Ciorciari, Policing Without a Political Plan? The New UN-Backed Mission in Haiti, Georgetown J. of Int. Affairs (2023).
[5] Id.
[6] Pietsch, supra note 2, at 2.
[7] Haiti president’s assassination: What we know so far, BBC, Jan. 31, 2023.
[8] Pietsch, supra note 2, at 2.
[9] Id.
[10] S.C. Res. 1542, ¶ 7.
[11] Id.
[12] Rep. of the S.C., March 2025 Monthly Forecast, at 21 (2025).
[13] Pietsch, supra note 2, at 2.
[14] S.C. Res. 2699, supra note 1, ¶ 25.
[15] Id.; U.N. Charter art. 39.
[16] U.N. Charter art. 39-51.
[17] S.C. Res. 2699, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
[18] Id.
[19] U.N. Charter art. 39-51.
[20] S.C. Res. 2699, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
[21] Moise Jean, The Political and Legal Ambiguities of the Multilateral Security Support Mission Authorized for Haiti, Harv. Int. L. J. (2024).
[22] S.C. Res. 2699, supra note 1, ¶ 8.
[23] Id.
[24] Moise Jean, The Political and Legal Ambiguities of the Multilateral Security Support Mission Authorized for Haiti, Harv. Int. L. J. (2024).
[25] S.C. Res. 2699, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
[26] Pietsch, supra note 2, at 2.
[27] Id.
[28] Karla Rios, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IN12331, Haiti in Crisis: What Role for a Multinational Security Support Mission? 1 (2024).
[29] Id.
[30] Id. at 2.
[31] Rep. of the S.C., March 2025 Monthly Forecast, at 21 (2025).
[32] Id.
[33] Id.
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
[36] Id. at 22.
