The tarnished history of Mexico’s judicial system led former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to propose “Plan C” for judicial reforms on February 5, 2024.[1] The plan includes creating public elections for judges, effective September 15, 2024, which will be implemented in phases.[2] Mexico’s current president, Claudia Sheinbaum, currently backs the reform; thus, Plan C will be enforced in the immediate future.[3] Mexico’s judicial reform is fairly unprecedented, as Bolivia is the only country in the world with a similar structure.[4] Mexico’s decision to hold public elections for all judicial officials is likely not in their citizens best interest, because it exposes their judicial branch to partisan pressures and other adverse influence.[5]
Judicial elections are not a completely new concept; many states in the United States (“U.S.”) publicly elect state-level judges, depending on their state constitutions.[6] Mexico’s reform differs from this practice, because it plans to hold national elections for all judges, including Supreme Court positions.[7] The reform attempts to establish a voting system with various checks and balances through a rigorous process.[8] In the new election process, candidates must apply by proving their legal competency and legal degree; they must also provide an essay, birth certificate, and letters of recommendation to the Evaluation Committee.[9] The Committee conducts a lottery of the candidates, narrowing the pool of candidates, and then publishes the results of the lottery to ensure impartiality.[10] Lastly, each of the other branches—executive and legislative—gets the chance to veto the candidates.[11] The approved candidates are then submitted to an electoral institute to be placed on ballots and conduct the election.[12]
The aim of this reform is to uproot corruption and give citizens the ability to have a say in the judicial branch.[13] Aside from the qualification component in the candidacy process, people have expressed concerns that elections would expose the courts to political bias from other branches and third parties.[14] The idea that the public election would actually reflect the people’s wishes conflicts with issues of low voting participation and substantial filtering by the other governmental branches.[15] That filtering process, when the branch is in the political majority, is heavily biased toward that controlling party’s preference.[16] In the U.S., the executive branch appoints U.S. Supreme Court justices; this may serve as a counterargument to the concern about the control Mexico’s executive branch has over its judiciary.[17] A major factor in this practice is that those appointed to the Supreme Court serve for life.[18] In theory, the justices are to work indefinitely with the same colleagues, who may have different views, promoting good behavior and preventing partisan pressure.[19] Further, judicial precedents last longer and there is a smaller chance of extreme judicial reform.[20] In contrast to the U.S.’ approach, the Mexican justices will have term limits. Therefore, every twelve years, the system is subject to massive overhauls on precedent, likely pressured by the other parties who won elections.[21]
Mexico’s judicial reforms also include: a reduced number of Supreme Court justices and shortened term limits of twelve years; restricted identification or faceless judges depending on case type; a judicial tribunal to ensure accountability, and; various salary reductions.[22] Faceless judges have been used by various countries to counter organized crime, whether from a terrorist group, cartel, or mafia.[23] The goal is to protect judges identities, so they may rule on organized crime without threat and increase the criminal court’s efficiency on criminal matters.[24] Events like the murder of Judge Pinzon on December 11, 2024, which was linked to organized crime and a series of political attacks in Gurrerro, further supports Mexico’s push to protect the identities of its judges.[25] Despite tragic events like these, the concept of faceless judges has attracted a fair share of scrutiny.[26] The practice of faceless judges was noted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”) as a “incompatible with … Human Rights, … threaten[ing] judicial independence, and … due process,” primarily because of the secrecy of the impartial trial and complications with recusal.[27] Moreover, the concept of faceless judges directly contradicts the previous goal of promotion of public will and transparency, through public elections.[28] The reduction of salary is also a questionable change, considering the branch’s history of bribery.[29] Lastly, the judicial disciplinary tribunal, also publically elected, aims to check elected justices by issuing unappealable sanctions, criminally charging, or impeaching justices that make corrupt decisions at anypoint in a case.[30] The main concern is any party influencing this body would have signifigant and unappealable control over the judicial branch.[31]
Bolivia is one of the only countries with a judicial structure similar to Mexico’s reformed structure.[32] In 2009, Evo Morales, Bolivia’s then president, proposed public elections which then took place in 2011, 2017, and 2024.[33] These changes were intended to decolonize the country, increase trust in the judicial system, and uproot corrupt elite from the system.[34] The changes have exacerbated impartiality and fairness issues.[35] The elections have extremely low voter turnouts; the voters who do show up are completely uninformed on the candidates and decide their vote on non-legal qualifications.[36] The available candidates are limited to those approved by the supermajority socialist party—backed by Morales—in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly (“Congress”), which creates issues of impartiality between the court system and politicians.[37] Famously, the publicly elected judicial branch sided with Morales, overturning the popular vote, and decided to extend Morales’ two-term limit, allowing him to run for a fourth term.[38] Further, the goal to increase trust in the branch has not been met, since there is an overall distrust by the public, reaching eighty percent in 2022.[39]
Bolivia highlights the practical issues that public elections have in garnering the people’s will and limiting partisan input into the judicial branch.[40] There are several differences in Mexico’s new system that may mitigate these issues. The Mexican Supreme Court’s term limits are double that of Bolivia’s, which is six years.[41] Mexico implements a more robust initial evaluation, through a third party evaluation committee, before the legislative and executive approval.[42] Mexico also has a Judicial Tribunal that seeks to discipline corruption, which Bolivia lacks.[43] Due to the lack of precedent for this type of system, it is unknown whether these differences will steer Mexico away from Bolivia’s shortcomings.[44] Taken at face value, the differences seem slight and inconsequential.[45]
Bolivia’s judicial system shows that Mexico’s judicial reform may further subject its judicial system to partisan pressures and corruption.[46] This is not to say that the concept cannot promote justice, as there are various adjustments and proposals to fix these problems. The U.S. Embassy notes that the removal of certain requirements like “the reduction of the required years of experience” is primarily concerning.[47] This suggests that candidates with better qualifications can limit potential problems with public elections.[48] Increasing required trainings could also help deal with the large amount of unqualified applicants.[49] Anonymous evaluations by an entity separate from the legislative branch could reduce the political pressures and ensure competency.[50] To avoid the ballot issues like those in Bolivia, limiting the number of candidates presented and providing detailed information about them on the ballot could inform voters better.[51] Lastly, while the judicial disciplinary tribunal aims to address corruption during a judge’s term, the system is subject to partisan pressures that would be minimized in a more objective system.[52] The initial change may also push parties to find resolutions outside of court, using arbitration, which could improve judicial efficiency.[53]
Mexico’s judicial reform carries a great deal of uncertainty and a multitude of questions. Bolivia’s implementation of a similar system has not indicated that public judicial elections are an effective solution, without further adjustments. Even with the change, Mexico’s judicial branch is likely subject to influence from ruling parties and criminal organizations. Mexico must find away to address these issues in order for its new system to promote justice.
[1] La reforma judicial y el dictamen de los diputados, El País, Aug. 27, 2024, https://elpais.com/mexico/opinion/2024-08-27/la-reforma-judicial-y-el-dictamen-de-diputados.html.
[2] Mexico’s Sweeping Judicial Overhaul Formally Takes Effect, Reuters, Sept. 16, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexicos-sweeping-judicial-overhaul-formally-takes-effect-2024-09-16.
[3] Jaques Coste, Claudia Sheinbaum Stays on AMLO’s Course, Americas Q., Feb. 7, 2024, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/claudia-sheinbaum-stays-on-amlos-course/.
[4] Gustavo Cárdenas, Bolivia Is a Warning for Mexico’s Judicial Reform, Americas Q., Oct. 25, 2024, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/bolivia-is-a-warning-for-mexicos-judicial-reform/.
[5] See generally Id.; Cárdenas, supra note 4; Raid Abu-Manneh et al., Mexico’s Controversial Judicial Reform Takes Effect: Assessing Its Impact, (Oct. 2, 2024), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2024/10/mexicos-controversial-judicial-reform-takes-effect-assessing-its-impact.
[6] See, e.g., Colo. Const. art. VI, § 20.
[7] See Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de reforma del Poder Judicial, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] Sept. 15, 2024, art. 1, § II.
[8] Raid Abu‑Manneh et al., Mexico’s Controversial Judicial Reform Takes Effect (Oct. 2, 2024).
[9] Pamela Starr, Judicial Reform in Mexico: A Comparative Between the Old and New Process for Electing Judges, Wilson Center, Feb. 20, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/judicial-reform-mexico-comparative-between-old-and-new-process-electing-judges.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] See generally, Id.
[14] See generally, Azul A. Aguiar, Judicial Reform and Institutional Challenges, Análisis Plural, June 6, 2024, avalible at https://doi.org/10.31391/ap.vi7.119.
[15] Id. at 10.
[16] Id.
[17] U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
[18] U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
[19] U.S. Supreme Court, About the Supreme Court: The Court as an Institution, Supreme Court of the United States, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/institution.aspx#:~:text=To%20ensure%20an%20independent%20Judiciary,has%20generally%20meant%20life%20terms [Note this system has its own fair criticisms, particularly when there is a lack of opposing views, but is overall historically an effective judicial system.].
[20] U.S. Const., supra note 14, § 1-3.
[21] See supra note 7 [discussing the uncertainty 12-year term limits bring].
[22] Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de reforma del Poder Judicial, DOF, Sept. 15, 2024,art. 2, § I; art. 3, § IV; art. 4, § III; art. 5, § V.
[23] See, e.g., Ivana Saric, Brazil’s Rio State Adopts ‘Faceless Courts’ to Protect Judges, OCCRP (July 10, 2019), https://www.occrp.org/en/news/brazils-rio-state-adopts-faceless-courts-to-protect-judges.
[24] See generally Id. (discussing Brazil’s use of faceless courts, which aligns with Mexico’s reasoning for adopting a similar approach).
[25] Judge killed outside courthouse in Mexico’s Acapulco, CBS News (Dec. 12, 2024), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-killed-outside-courthouse-acapulco/.
[26] E.g. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., IACHR Expresses Concerns over Judiciary Reform in Mexico and Warns of Threats to Judicial Independence, Access to Justice, and Rule of Law, Press Release No. 213/24 (Sept. 12, 2024), https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2024/213.asp
[27] Id.; Javier Meléndez López Velarde, Blind Justice Always Has a Face: The Influence of Faceless Judges on the U.S.-Mexico Relationship, Wilson Center (Sept. 30, 2024), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/blind-justice-always-has-face-influence-faceless-judges-us-mexico-relationship [hereinafter Blind Justice].
[28] Blind Justice, Wilson Center.
[29] Gabriel Ferreyra, Unpacking the Mexican Federal Judiciary: An Inner Look at the Ethos of the Judicial Branch, 11 Mexican Law Review 3 (2018), https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-05782018000200057.
[30] Norton Rose, Constitutional Reform to Mexico’s Judiciary, (2024), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-us/knowledge/publications/2986ea86/constitutional-reform-to-mexicos-judicial-branch#:~:text=The%20new%20Judicial%20Disciplinary%20Tribunal%20will%20investigate%20and%20impose%20sanctions,and%20may%20not%20be%20reelected.
[31] Stephanie Brewer, Judicial Reform in Mexico: A Setback for Human Rights, WOLA (Aug. 20, 2024), https://www.wola.org/analysis/judicial-reform-in-mexico-a-setback-for-human-rights/.
[32] Constitución Política del Estado [Const. Pol. del Estado] art. 182 (Bol.).; Lucila Del Aguila Llausás & Nicolás Devia-Valbuena, Justice by Vote? Lessons for Mexico from Bolivia’s Judicial Elections, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Nov. 14, 2024), https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/11/justice-vote-lessons-mexico-bolivias-judicial-elections.
[33] Id.
[34] Paola Flores & Isabel Debre, Bolivia’s Former Leader Evo Morales Seeks a Political Comeback from His Stronghold in the Tropics, AP NEWS (2025), https://apnews.com/article/bolivia-judicial-elections-morales-mexico-overhaul-constitution-beba1908c766b982dd90532723062e38.
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] Id; See also Const. Pol. del Estado art. 183 (Bol.) [regarding the candidacy process].
[38] Id.
[39] Rule of Law Index: Bolivia 2022, World Justice Project (2022), https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/rule-of-law/bolivia-2022.
[40] See generally International Commission of Jurists, Informe sobre la Situación de la Justicia en Bolivia, ICJ at 18-20 (Dec. 2024), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Informe-Bolivia.pdf.
[41] Supra note 7.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Supra note 31.
[45] Id. (Vargas discussing the likelihood that Bolivia’s judicial issue are an outlier).
[46] Supra note 4.
[47] On Mexico’s Judicial Reform Proposal, U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Mexico (Mar. 2025), https://mx.usembassy.gov/on-mexicos-judicial-reform-proposal/.
[48] Id.
[49] David Shirk, Mexico’s 2024 Judicial Reform: The Politicization of Justice, Wilson Center (Mar. 20, 2025),https://www.wilsoncenter.org/microsite/3/node/129511.
[50] Supra note 30.
[51] Melissa Starr, Mexico’s Judicial Reforms: Overwhelming Ballots Here to Stay, Diplomatic Courier (Feb. 27, 2025), https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/mexicos-judicial-reforms-overwhelming-ballots-here-to-stay.
[52] See Jeremy Duda, The Future (and Present) of Judicial Elections Are on the Ballot, Axious Phoenix (Sept. 13, 2024), https://www.axios.com/local/phoenix/2024/09/13/prop-137-judicial-retention-elections-supreme-court-justices.
[53] Edgar Grajeda et al., El Arbitraje como Potencial Remedio ante las Reformas Constitucionales en México, Pérez-Llorca (Nov. 2024), https://www.perezllorca.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/241101-NJ-El-Arbitraje-como-potencial-remedio-ante-las-Reformas-Constitucionales-en-Mexico.pdf.
